PRC-25, FORGOTTEN LEGEND; Part III, By Dennis Starks
The Legend Begins(1965-1970),
This chapter in the PRC-25's lengthy saga has taken several forms. None seemed to do it the justice it deserves. So I've decided to take a "time-line" approach to it's "Legend". I believe this will make it much simpler for the reader to follow it's progression, and judge it's impact on history.
1952,
Requirements for the new generation of PRC-25 family of equipment are laid down.
1954,
Development contracts with RCA are let.
1957,
The PRC-25(XC-1) appears.
1958,
The PRC-25(XC-2) appears.
1959,
The PRC-25(XC-3) appears early in the year.
1960,
November, Two modified PRC-25(XC-3) prototypes are tested.
In June, the VRC-12 is adopted as a standard issue item of equipment.
1961,
Though the PRC-25 had been officially adopted in May(after two years of testing and refining the final version), for some reason it would not be put into full scale production for another four years.This four year delay in production might be explained later, but by 1965 there would exist a dire need for these radios that surpassed any higher echelon excuses. October of this year saw an initial contract for production units with RCA.
1962,
December, deleveries begin of production PRC-25's.
1963,
In August, initial shipments, and distribution to U.S. forces in Europe begin. Europe had become our traditional test arena for equipment of all types some years before.
1964,
Testing of the PRC-25 family of equipment, including the VRC-12(which had been adopted one year before the PRC-25), had been completed in South Vietnam. A few of the sets were tested by signal advisers who had concluded it was a significant improvement over the older PRC-10's. Despite their favorable conclusions, they were unable to obtain approval for it's adoption as the standard adviser radio. This was due in part to the extreme cost of the radios, and the lack of logistic support in place. Late in the year, 500 PRC-10's are dispatched to South Vietnam as an emergency measure for use by advisers.
1965,
By now only token quantities of the PRC-25 existed which had no doubt been built for the purpose of field trials. When combat troops began to deploy to South Vietnam in the Spring, they were supplied with the same early generation of equipment that the adviser groups before them had been, the PRC-10. Yes, the PRC-10, it was used extensively by all those involved, enemy & allied alike until the late 60's(much later than generally believed by most people).
- In the summer, the limitations of the PRC-10 began to result in excessive combat casualties with the Marines, and the 173d Airborne Brigade, General Westmoreland then issued an "urgent battlefield requirement" for 2000 of the new radios which had been tested in this theater the year before. The Signal Corps responded by shipping the entire stock of PRC-25's on hand(only 1000 sets which had been destined for Europe) and began emergency procurement for the remaining 1000 sets of the order. This initial 1000 new radio sets where in the hands of troops within a few weeks. Of the 2000 set order, 1500 would be received by advisers, and Special Forces, with the remaining 500 going to combat troops.
- An "X" mode requirement(speech security equipment) was added, to specifications for improvements to the PRC-25. This would eventually resulted in a re-designation of the radio to the PRC-77.(Special Note: it was not the redesign to eliminate the output tube that prompted this re-designation, nor the "X" mode requirement alone, it was a combination of all the refinements that would eventually warrant a re-designation to PRC-77)
1966,
"Operation Attleboro", In November, U.S. Forces(a small task force of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade) are prematurely drawn into the heavy jungle of War Zone C to ferret out Viet Cong storage depots. Instead, they stumble on to the head quarters of the notorious 9th Viet Cong Division who immediately surrounded the three company Task Force, cutting off all attempts at relief.
- Throughout the morning of the 4th, relief forces fought their way to the beleaguered task force. Using only a PRC-25, the task force commander, Maj. Guy S. Meloy, eventually controlled eleven companies from five separate battalions while lying pinned down by enemy fire. To aid this miraculous feat, Sfc. Ray Burdette had assemble a ground plane antenna(RC-292) and propped it up against a nearby tree. This for two days before pressure was relieved long enough to effect a withdraw of the battered task force. This was the first time that a large Viet Cong force stood and fought.
- The PRC-25 is now listed as a replacement for the PRC-9, and PRC-10 inclusive, in Australian tables for equipment(which also includes the PRC-64, -41, -47, -62, GRA-71, GRC-106, PRT-4 & PRR-9, and VRC-12 among others).
1967,
15,000 PRC-25's, and 7000 VRC-12's are now in the hands of U.S. troops, and another 9000 PRC-25's are being issued to the South Vietnamese Army. Issue to the South Vietnamese army had been purposely delayed to relieve frequency/traffic congestion.
- November, after the "Battle For Dak To" involving the 173d Airborne Brigade's 2d Division, and the 503 Infantry, against the 174th North Vietnamese Regiment atop Hill 875. Combat casualties for equipment alone were listed as 89ea PRC-25's, 22ea PRT-4's & 19ea PRR-9's(173d Airborne), and 32ea field telephones.(Note these were PRC-25's and not PRC-77's!)
- Combat loses of equipment for this year deplete the Army's entire inventory of tape antennas. As an emergency expedient 15,000 special bushings are fabricated to adapt the old PRC-10's antenna to the PRC-25.
- It is discovered that only half of the radio operators using the PRC-25 are Signalman, or have received any formal training. Most operators are found to be simple infantryman drafted to the radio operator position to replace fallen radioman. The simplicity of the PRC-25 is a great success. Because of this simplicity it is proposed to initiate PRC-25 training to "all" Army trainees, and not just signalman, this is an unprecedented act! Fall of this year saw the completion of testing of the newer PRC-77.
1968,
In May, shipments of PRC-77's began to Southeast Asia. They had been delayed due to deficiencies in the batteries for the KY-38 encryption equipment(because they could not vent, they were prone to explode), and for lack of a single capacitor which had been supplied by a subcontractor gone bankrupt. By December, 9000 sets where in the hands of U.S. troops.
- Theater commanders are unwilling to turn in their PRC-25's upon receipt of new PRC-77's. The PRC-25 had become "Too good, no one wanted to give them up!"
1969,
Those who believed the war was to be fought and won as a counterinsurgency rather than a conventional war, profess that the PRC-25 alone had far more utility than a B-52 and it's associated support, or any troposcatter or satellite terminal.
- In late December, infantryman overrun the camp of the highly successful Viet Cong A3 Technical Reconnaissance Unit. Among the equipment captured included 1400 hand written copies of intercepted Allied messages, 2ea PRC-25's, 1ea PRC-77, and 1ea Chinese R-139 receiver.
1970,
PRC-25's had become the primary targets for specially formed enemy units who entered battle with one mission, to capture these radios. In the beginning, the first priority for the issue of these sets went to Viet Cong units monitoring American traffic. By the early 70's, so many PRC-25's had been captured, or stolen, that it had become a standard issue item for most enemy line units.
1976,
- My first experience of many with a PRC-25(listening to Hispanic TV broadcast off the coast of Guantonimo). As of 1980, I had never seen a PRC-77.
PRC-25, FORGOTTEN LEGEND; Part IV, By Dennis Starks
Forward,
- By the early 1970's, the new PRC-77's had become hopelessly intermixed with the old PRC-25's among all the using armed forces(regardless of country). Those who still had PRC-25's in inventory refused to turn them in being convinced of their value under fire.. Confusion was now to the extent that all official reports, manuals, etc would use their designations interchangeable, as indeed the radios themselves were for all practical purposes. For this reason it now becomes near impossible to separated the exploits of the two different models of the same radio. So we'll continue this story with that of the successor to the PRC-25's 'Legacy', the 'Ultimate PRC-25', the 'PRC-77'.
PRC-25 Legacy,
- History repeats itself! Just as the replacement for the SCR-300 was conceived just as it was introduced, and the PRC-10 had been replaced on paper a year before it had even been established in the field. The first PRC-25's had been in effect replaced before they were born. From the very beginning certain requirements had been in place for it's final version. The first, and primary priority was the elimination of it's output tube resulting in a 100% solid state radio. This early goal was for the PRC-25, and was never intended to result in the PRC-77. But as we will see, the original plans were foiled.
- It would seem that while the PRC-25 had been officially adopted as Standard "A" in 1961, this might have only been an expedient means of relieving pressure on the development-infrastructure. Adoption, did not mean that the sets would then go into immediate large scale production(which it didn't), but it might provide a means of stalling for time while development continued, and prove an effective ploy for obtaining the funds needed for the purchase of limited-production units, and their continued field trials. Indeed, the evidence shows that all those who where familiar with the PRC-25 as of 1965 had been exposed to it as the result of these "Field Trials" being conducted as late as 1964, and.not because of it's issue to any as standard equipment.
- But this Adoption/Extended-Development tactic backfired when in 1965 General Westmoreland issued his "urgent battlefield requirement". As the PRC-25 had been officially adopted as "Standard A", the powers that were could now provide no excuse for not supplying the radios especially as they already had a small quantity in hand. So these trials were brought to an abrupt halt. The unfinished PRC-25 being forced into an early, and hasty mass production by a completely unprepared industry. It would arrive In-Country with virtually no support structure, as one had not yet been established.
- Further development must then, out of necessity, take place under fire from hostile forces in actual combat, as indeed it did. We might conclude then that the development of the PRC-25 was never completed, and the emergency of war forced it's use prematurely. The results of this trial-by-fire would be a radio set that would not see a competent rival for near 30 years.
- Regardless of the PRC-25's premature obligations to war, work towards the replacement of it's output tube continued. Inadequacies began to show up in combat that would in turn be added to the list of it's planned refinements. Most had to do with ancillary equipment such as handsets, batteries, support equipment and logistics. All were quickly remedied.
- But some real problems also surfaced. The first was interference when used in close proximity to other radios, both on receive and creating interference when transmitting. This previously unforeseen problem became apparent when trying to use two like radios back-to-back as a repeater under certain conditions. But it became intolerable when they were combined with dozens of other radios(some being much more powerful) at congested communications sites. All having their antennas mounted inches from each other on common, overcrowded, towers. So included in the PRC-25's refinement package where steps to reduce spurious emissions during transmit, and provide it's receiver with better selectivity.
- In 1965, just as all the problems were solved, and refinements thought to be completed(including the replacement of it's output tube), the Army threw a monkey wrench into the works. It added a requirement for compatibility with speech security equipment(X mode). This would result in a delay of two more years before the deployment of the ultimate PRC-25. These two years where added as the result of bureaucratic mistrust, and foot dragging, rather than any limitations in technology, or industry.
Birth of The Ultimate PRC-25,
- In 1965, the National Security Agency(that government body having jurisdiction over all encryption equipment, and methods) was asked to develop speech security equipment for tactical units. They were at first reluctant to produce cryptographic equipment for combat infantryman that would undoubtedly be captured. But by January 1966, the NSA would agree to develop the device for portable radios. The NSA and the U.S.Army Electronics Command then designed a new radio from "a modified PRC-25" that could connect to the new speech security equipment. X mode is born. The PRC-77 ?, Not yet !
- The new radio was in fact not "new" at all, it was simply a refined PRC-25! Again, the PRC-77 was not the result of successfully replacing the PRC-25's output tube, this had already been done. Nor was it the result of any other circuit or design changes. It was all these refinements combined, and when joined by the X mode ability, and the deciding factor that 10's of thousands of the earlier radios had already been fielded as the result of the emergency of war. A positive method of distinguishing between the two was now needed. A modified designation such as PRC-25"B" was simply no longer adequate. So now, (less than one year after PRC-25's were first deployed to Vietnam),.the PRC-77 is born! If General Westmoreland's "urgent requirement" had been delayed only a couple of months, there might never have been a need for the designation of PRC-77 affixed to the radio that received it!
- By the fall of 1967 the PRC-77 was still not yet available. Not at all because of any deficiencies in the radio, or protracted development time. All problems had been worked out long before(PRC-25), all testing had been completed, the PRC-77 was in production, the radio was ready! It was again NSA foot dragging, combined with minor problems with the new encryption equipment, that would delay deployment of the PRC-77 till May of 1968. By December, 9000 new radios would finally be in the hands of the troops.
- The new PRC-77 was externally identical to the PRC-25 in every respect. Without it's data tag in place, it is absolutely impossible to tell the difference between the two. Once opened up, only a trained eye can even tell the difference, and most of it's internal modules are interchangeable. But it did boast several improvements; it's receiver had been upgraded with better selectivity, it's transmitter's spurious emissions had been reduced, and of course, the output tube had been eliminated(though some sources will report an increase in RF output/range, any difference is minimal).
- Lastly, the radio's audio bandwidth had been widened to accommodate the new X mode requirement. This would eventually allow the fringe benefit of using various data modes. These modes included MCW*, TTY, and modern day Packet.
*(MCW was used by Australians who did not yet have access to the highly restricted U.S. voice encryption equipment. These devices were protected to the point of paranoia until the mid 70's. Neither had they developed systems of their own. MCW then was their only means of transmitting secure messages. This was accomplished by using an external tone oscillator, and CW key. The same method was also practiced by various para-military groups being supplied equipment by the CIA.)
PRC-25, FORGOTTEN LEGEND; Part V, By Dennis Starks
The PRC-25 Legacy Continues, The PRC-77,
- By the early 1970's, production of the PRC-25 had ceased. Over 130,000 radios had been built in the U.S. alone. Production had continued even after the advent and large scale deployment of the PRC-77. The PRC-25 had become legend, in the words of General Westmoreland himself, "the PRC-25 was the single most valuable contribution to the war effort". Not the M-16 rifle nor any other item of ordinance, but a lowly radio!
- Though designed for use at a platoon level, the circumstances of war and environmental conditions had made it the primary communications at every level from 10 men to 10,000. The PRC-25 had become the modern day quide-on, or flag, carried at the head of battle charges 100 years before. Just as 100 years before, the quide-on bearer was the primary target of an opposing force, but as he fell, the next soldier would gallantly take up the flag, and charge on. The simplicity of the PRC-25 allowed the same thing, should it's operator fall(as many, MANY, did!), the next soldier would snatch it up and carry on.(many surviving examples of the PRC-25 still retain their unit markings, not just numbers painted on them, but elaborately painted unit crest, or insignia). Even though the PRC-25 was still in the hands of troops, as it would be for many years to come, the Legacy is now carried on by it's slightly younger twin, the PRC-77.
- By 1973, the PRC-77 had been established the world over. It was being produced by at least four domestic manufacturers, and being distributed to at least 10 countries(some in kit form). Foreign companies had begun to build their own for both domestic use, and export. Known companies producing radios include RCA, Magnavox, E Systems, Cincinnati Electronics, Tadiran. Countries receiving radios included U.S., Germany, Spain, Norway, Korea, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Australia, and others. The average cost of the set is $1200.
- In the late 1970's, a viable radio for use at the squad level was finally introduced after 15 years of development, the PRC-68. It would start to make a dent in the needed quantities of PRC-77's as it would no longer be needed at this low level of the command structure.(Neither the PRC-25 nor -77 had ever been intended for use as a squad level radio. Lack of a viable radio, and the limitations of range in a dense jungle environment had forced them into this service).
- By 1980, E-System alone(a Johnny come lately) had delivered 25,000 sets to the U.S. military, and exported over 12,000. By 1985, they had delivered 40,000 to the U.S. military alone, and had exported equipment to 50 countries. In 1981, Sentinel Electronics was added to the list with a U.S. order of over 12,000 radios at a cost of $900 per radio. In 1983, another order was placed with Sentinel for $3 mil, and NAPCO was added as a supplier with $2.09 mil order. In 1984, C & G Associates was awarded a contract worth $1.84 mil for over 2000 radios. By 1986, Iran had begun exporting PRC-77's(six years after their disassociation with the U.S.). In 1989, Lucas Hazelton(AN/COMM) received a contract for $22 mil(the same year that the PRC-119 begins deployment). The above listed data is only the tip of the iceberg.
- By the mid 1980's, the success of the various generations of the PRC-68(including the PRC-126) had proved good enough that they could be used at higher levels than they had been intended, this too would reduce the quantities of PRC-77's needed in the field. Also by this time, there were many usurpers that claimed to be the successor to the vulnerable old PRC-77 both foreign and domestic. They would all prove false.
- Logic might suggest that with all these attacks on the domain of the PRC-77, it would begin a decline from the military seen, but the reverse is true. There were still not enough radios sets in service to meet the demand. Some units of the National Guard and Reserve had to resort to alternate equipment to meet their needs. Radios like the Trans-World PRC-1077 would appear in their inventories. Not because it had been adopted, or was an authorized replacement for the PRC-77, but because it was all they could get, and it had been approved for purchases.
- In 1987 the official successor to the PRC-77 was adopted, the PRC-119. It was grossly over complicated and required the constant attention of well trained operators and technicians. It's extremely complicated/sophisticated design required service personnel to make regular rounds of the units equipped with them to keep radios running. The supposed benefits of Singars, and frequency hopping were lost in the operators inability to set up or maintain these modes, and the radio's frequent failures.
- In 1990, Desert Storm, the U.S. military was sorrily lacking in field communications equipment to outfit it's hurriedly mobilized forces. There were not enough PRC-119's nor it's sister systems to go around. Again, the PRC-77 is put into action, and again there are not enough. Orders are placed with every company known to still produce the radios. Domestic production wasn't enough, and radios had to be imported from Israel, and Germany(VRC-12 systems were similarly acquired). Units that are issued the PRC-77 vice the PRC-119 don't yet realize how lucky they were.
- By 1992 it was estimated that over 500,000 radios had been built in the U.S. alone, and it was still in production for the U.S. Army as of 1994 by NAPCO(six years after the adoption and deployment of it's successor, the PRC-119). By the mid 1990's, units that had been issued their new PRC-119's, and had been forced to turned in their old PRC-77's were begging to get their old PRC-77's back. Experiences during Desert Storm, and after, had proved the new PRC-119 to be too complicated to be operable by the common soldier, and it's temperamental nature required constant servicing. The hard won lessons of Vietnam which had spelled the extreme success of the PRC-25 and -77 had been forgotten! The 40 year old proven philosophy of "ultimate simplicity" as apposed to "ultimate versatility" has yet to be re-learned.
- It's most impressive, that after 42 years, the story of the PRC-25, and the PRC-77 cannot be concluded, nor my account of it. Because they still serve on. Many thousands of PRC-25's still languish in storage awaiting a call to duty, or are used in a diminished capacity every day. And the PRC-77 is still in production(in one form or another), and still in use, all over the world. The age of some radios being nerely twice that of their operators!
- Here is a summary of the longest lived military radios(none would ever approach the production numbers or widespread use of the PRC-25 & -77):
Navy TCS, 1939 to approx 1969, 30 years.
BC-610, 1940 to 1969, 29 years.
Gibson Girl, 1942 to approx 1985, 43 years
VRC-12, 1960 to now, 39 years(and still going)
PRC-25 & PRC-77, 1961 to now, 38 years(and still going)
Dennis Starks; Collector/Historian
Midwest Military Communications Museum
email:
military-radio-guy@juno.com